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Abstract
A novel decomposition highlights the scope for information to influence the term struc-
ture of interest rates. Based on the law of total covariance, we show that real term premia in
macroeconomic models contain a component that depends on covariances of realised stochas-
tic discount factors and a component that depends on covariances of expectations of those
stochastic discount factors. The impact of different informational assumptions can then be
identified by looking at their effect on the second, expectational, component. If agents have
full information about technology in a simple macro-finance model then the conditional co-
variance of expectations is low, which contributes to the real term premia implied by the
model being at least an order of magnitude too small, a result that is unchanged if some
components of technology are unobservable or observed with noise. To generate realistic
term premia, we draw on the beauty contest literature by differentiating between private
and public information and introducing the possibility of strategic complementarities in the
formation of expectations. A quantitative version of the model is found to explain a sig-
nificant proportion of observed term premia when estimated using data on expectations of
productivity growth from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
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Since investors lack any clear sense of objective evidence regarding prices of specula-
tive assets, the process by which their opinions are derived may be especially social.
Robert J. Shiller, 1984
1 Introduction
The way that developments in the real economy affect the pricing of financial assets is central
to much recent research in monetary economics and macro-finance. Despite this, quantitative
DSGE models of the type developed by Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003,
2007) continue to have ineluctable difficulty generating risk premia of magnitude anything like
those seen in financial markets. For example, Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) find that the
average term premium on a default-free nominal 5-year zero-coupon bond is less than one basis
point in a medium-scale DSGE model with nominal rigidities and a reasonable coefficient of
relative risk aversion. Estimates from Adrian et al. (2013) suggest that the term premium on
5-year US Treasury Bills 1999-2017 was, at 57.2 bps, at least an order of magnitude higher.
This paper presents a new decomposition that stresses the importance of informational as-
sumptions for the emergence of sizeable term premia in asset pricing models. We focus our
attention on the relationship between information and the real term premium.1 Using the stan-
dard no-arbitrage pricing condition, we divide the real term premium into a component that is
affected by information and a component that is not. By applying the law of total covariance,
the mean of the real term premium at any maturity can be shown to depend on covariances
of successive realised stochastic discount factors and covariances of successive expectations of
stochastic discount factors, with the latter being directly affected by the informational assump-
tions imposed on the model. The new decomposition prompts us to attribute the quantitative
failure of medium-scale DSGE models to informational assumptions that are unable to deliver
sufficient covariance in expectations. Having identified the channels by which information im-
pacts on term premia, the new decomposition provides a useful framework in which to explore
alternative assumptions about information.
We begin our analysis by focusing on the real term premium on two-period bonds in a
simplified yet tractable model where persistent and transitory technology shocks are the only
exogenous disturbances. In keeping with quantitative results from medium-scale DSGE models,
we find that the term premium is small if agents are assumed to have full information about the
current level of technology. This is because the unconditional covariance of both realised and
expected stochastic discount factors is low for any realistic paramaterisation of the technology
1 Information has the potential to influence term premia through its effects on real term premia and inflation
risk premia. Our decision to concentrate on real term premia reflects a belief as in Ho¨rdahl and Tristani (2012)
that “most of the average slope in the nominal term structure is due to compensation for real risks, rather than
inflation risk.” We also have reservations about empirical estimates of the inflation risk premia, which are yet to
settle in the literature and often differ across specifications using survey data, synthetic yields or TIPS.
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process and any reasonable level of risk aversion. The unconditional covariance of expectations
is especially small, a result that still holds if we assume that the representative agent has only
partial or noisy information and so has to infer the current level of technology and break it down
into persistent and transitory components.
In thinking of alternative informational assumptions that may increase the covariance of
expected stochastic discount factors, we are guided by the quote of Shiller (1984) above the
start of this introduction. We interpret his hypothesis of a social process driving opinions as
motivation for exploring informational assumptions that introduce strategic complementarities
into the formation of expectations. Drawing on the literature on beauty contests, we look at
what happens when agents price the real term premium according to forecasts of technology that
reward the agent for being similar not only to fundamentals but also to the average forecast
across all agents. In this scenario, the greater the strategic complementarity in forecasting
the more that agents are willing to incorporate aggregate and idiosyncratic noise into their
forecasts of future technology. If the aggregate noise is persistent then it will induce additional
unconditional autocovariance in expectations of the stochastic discount factor, which increases
term premia as agents demand compensation for the extra risk they face.
The potential for complementarities in forecasting to occasion significant term premia is first
demonstrated in our simple analytical framework, where as informational assumptions they gain
traction by increasing the unconditional covariance of expectations of the stochastic discount
factor. We find the same result in a more general model in which the degree of strategic
complementarities is tightly disciplined by data on individual forecasts of productivity from the
Survey of Professional Forecasters. When estimated, the general model generates a real premium
on 5-year zero-coupon bonds of 23.8 bps if strategic complementarities are present, a distinct
improvement on the 5.6-7.2 bps that is estimated when they are absent, and more than 40%
of the 57.2 bps term premium previously noted for 5-year US Treasury Bills 1997-2017. Our
decomposition attributes all the extra term premium to a larger covariance in expectations of
the stochastic discount factor.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature before Section 3
applies the law of total covariance to derive our new decomposition. Section 4 presents the
implications of different informational assumptions for the premium on a two-period bond in
our simplified analytical model. Section 5 presents the more general business cycle model and
discusses quantitative results from its estimation. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
The finding that standard general equilibrium asset pricing models are inconsistent with data on
the equity premium and the term structure of interest rates dates back to Mehra and Prescott
(1985), Backus et al. (1989), and Hansen and Jagannathan (1991). A large literature evolved
in response to this apparent “puzzling” disconnect between models and data, including ex-
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planations based on recursive preferences (Epstein and Zin, 1989), long-run risk (Bansal and
Yaron, 2004; Croce, 2014), rare disasters (Rietz, 1988; Barro, 2006) and habit formation (Jer-
mann, 1998; Abel, 1999; Rudebusch and Swanson, 2008). However, models which include one
or more of the above mechanisms typically explain data on risk premia only at the expense of
implausibility still remaining at some other margin. Tallarini (2000) shows that asset pricing
models with recursive preferences can simultaneously match data on the equity risk premium
and the risk-free rate with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 50, considerably less than
what is needed to justify the risk premium with standard preferences but still well above the
levels usually estimated in micro data. Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) similarly ask whether a
medium-scale DSGE model with long-run risk and recursive preferences can match the average
term premium on a nominal 10-year bond. The answer is yes with a plausible degree of long-run
risk, but their preferred specification still relies on a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 110.
An attempt to rationalise the ostensibly high coefficients of relative risk aversion has been
made by Barillas et al. (2009) in the literature on ambiguity aversion. They show that the market
price of risk includes components that compensate agents not only for known risks but also for
ambiguity surrounding the true data generating process for returns, in which case the high
coefficients of relative risk aversion in recursive preference formulations can be re-interpreted as
measuring reasonable levels of aversion to both risk and ambiguity. Results from van Binsbergen
et al. (2012) caution against applying this reasoning to the results of Rudebusch and Swanson
(2012) though, finding that inflation would still need to be unrealistically volatile for a standard
DSGE model with nominal frictions to square with the US Treasury yield curve, even if the high
coefficient of relative risk aversion is rationalised by ambiguity aversion. van Binsbergen et al.
(2012) work with a model in which the capital stock is endogenous, which moderates the effects
of exogenous fluctuations in capital that are important in Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) .
A number of authors have explored how amending the standard informational assumptions
in macroeconomic models can help explain the behaviour of selected financial assets. Cogley
and Sargent (2008) create significant equity premia by requiring agents to re-learn the law of
motion for consumption growth after a bout of pessimism brought on by the Great Depression,
although the premia eventually dissipate as the influence of the initial pessimism declines. Col-
lard et al. (2018) report similar findings in a model where ambiguity-averse agents fear that
their model of the joint distribution of future consumption and dividends may be misspecified.
Another promising line of research is by Luo (2010) and Luo and Young (2016), who exam-
ine simple portfolio choice models in which agents solve a rational inattention problem of the
type introduced by Sims (2003). Models in which higher-order expectations play a role in the
dynamics of equity prices have been proposed in work by Allen et al. (2006), Bacchetta and
Wincoop (2008), Kasa et al. (2014) and Barillas and Nimark (2018) that is broadly related
to the beauty contest literature of Morris and Shin (2002) and Angeletos and Pavan (2007).
The idea that strategic motives can amplify volatility in aggregate expectations is studied by
Angeletos and La’O (2013), who demonstrate how random matching of agents uncertain about
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their idiosyncratic productivity makes expectations volatile even when aggregate productivity
is common knowledge. Benhabib et al. (2015) make a related point in a model with multiple
equilibria. We regard these approaches as complementary to ours.
3 Decomposing the term premium
This section explains bond pricing in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium and applies the
law of total covariance to derive our novel decomposition of risk premia. In what follows we
fix ideas by assuming that financial assets are priced by a representative agent, leaving until
Section 4.5 the decomposition of risk premia in beauty contests with heterogeneous agents and
strategic complementarities in expectations formation.
3.1 The household’s optimisation problem
The household’s expected utility is
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs−tu(cs, ls) (1)
in all periods t ≥ 0, where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, Et is the conditional expectation
operator with respect to the information set It, (ct, lt) ∈ Ω ⊆ (R+)2 is a consumption and labour
supply choice and u : Ω→ R+ is the period utility function. The flow budget constraint is
ct +
N∑
n=1
p
(n)
t b
(n)
t = wtlt + dt +
N∑
n=1
p
(n−1)
t b
(n)
t−1 (2)
where wt is the nominal wage and dt is lump-sum income. The household can invest in non-
contingent zero-coupon real bonds that have a redemption value of one unit of consumption at
maturity. Their period t holdings of bonds due to mature in n periods are denoted by b
(n)
t for
n = 1, 2, . . . , N , with corresponding prices p
(n)
t . Note that bond holdings b
(n)
t−1 inherited from
period t− 1 are priced at p(n−1)t in period t. The price of a bond at maturity is its redemption
value, hence p
(0)
t = 1.
The representative household maximises utility (1) subject to the sequence of flow bud-
get constraints (2) and conditions ruling out Ponzi schemes. An interior solution satisfies N
consumption Euler equations of the form
p
(n)
t = Et
(
mt+1p
(n−1)
t+1
)
(3)
for n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, where mt+1 is the stochastic discount factor defined by
mt+1 ≡ βuc(ct+1, lt+1)
uc(ct, lt)
(4)
Equation (3) is the standard asset pricing condition equating the price of an asset to its expected
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discounted price in the following period. Together with the law of iterated expectations, it implies
that the price of a bond p
(n)
t is given by the expected product of successive stochastic discount
factors over the maturity of the bond,
p
(n)
t = Et
n∏
j=1
mt+j (5)
These bond prices can be translated into yields by defining the continuously-compounded yield
of an n-period zero-coupon bond as the value of i
(n)
t that satisfies p
(n)
t exp(ni
(n)
t ) = 1, in which
case the yield in per-period terms is
i
(n)
t = −
1
n
ln p
(n)
t (6)
We denote the yield on a one period bond as it ≡ i(1)t without a superscript to simplify notation.
3.2 Comovement, expectations and the term premium
The stochastic nature of bond prices implies that bonds of maturity n > 1 are a source of risk
for the household, even if there is no possibility of default.2 It is well-known from the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) that a risk-averse household demands compensation for holding
bonds if there is undesirable comovement between bond prices and the household’s marginal
utilities of consumption. Since marginal utilities depend on realised stochastic discount factors
and bond prices are a function of expected stochastic discount factors, the term premium will
depend on the joint autocovariance structure of realisations and expectations.
The real term premium at maturity n is defined relative to the hypothetical price of an
n-period bond under risk neutrality. Following the literature in Andreasen (2012), Gu¨rkaynak
and Wright (2012) and Rudebusch and Swanson (2008, 2012), the risk-neutral price is assumed
to be
p˜
(n)
t = e
−itEtp˜
(n−1)
t+1 = Et
n−1∏
j=0
e−it+j (7)
which is the redemption value of an n-period bond discounted by expected future one-period
bond yields rather than expected household stochastic discount factors. Translating prices into
yields as we did for equation (6), the risk-neutral yield at maturity n is
i˜
(n)
t '
1
n
Et
n−1∑
j=0
it+j (8)
to an approximation that ignores a Jensen’s inequality term. It coincides with the bond price
predicted by the expectations theory of the term structure. The per-period real term premium
2 Holding bonds of maturity n = 1 is not risky as they always deliver one unit of consumption next period.
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in bond prices is defined by
ψ
(n)
t ≡
1
n
(
p˜
(n)
t − p(n)t
)
(9)
with ψ
(1)
t = 0 because p˜
(1)
t = p
(1)
t . With regard to yields the term premium is i
(n)
t − i˜(n)t .
3.3 A useful decomposition
The real term premium on bond prices for n = 2 is given by equations (5), (7) and (9) as
ψ
(2)
t =
1
2
(
Et(e
−ite−it+1)− Et(mt+1mt+2)
)
(10)
The last term on the right hand side of (10) satisfies Et(mt+1mt+2) = Covt(mt+1,mt+2) +
Etmt+1Etmt+2 by the definition of conditional covariance. Combining the Euler equation (3)
with the bond yield equation (6) allows us to write Etmt+1 = e
−it and Et+1mt+2 = e−it+1 . By
the law of iterated expectations the latter becomes Etmt+2 = Ete
−it+1 and the last term on the
right hand side is
Et(mt+1mt+2) = Covt(mt+1,mt+2) + e
−itEte−it+1 (11)
Applying analogous reasoning to the first term on the right hand side of (10) yields
Et(e
−ite−it+1) = Covt(Etmt+1,Et+1mt+2) + e−itEte−it+1 (12)
and the decomposed real term premium is
ψ
(2)
t =
1
2
[−Covt(mt+1,mt+2) + Covt(Etmt+1,Et+1mt+2)] (13)
The unconditional mean of the real term premium follows as
Eψ(2) =
1
2
[−Cov(mt+1,mt+2) + Cov(Etmt+1,Et+1mt+2)] (14)
by applying the law of total covariance to equation (13).
The novelty is the ability to decompose the real term premium into components depending
on conditional covariances of successive realised and expected stochastic discount factors. A
positive term premium arises if the conditional covariance of expectations of stochastic discount
factors is positive and larger than the conditional covariance of realised stochastic discount
factors over the maturity of the bond. The intuition comes from risk premia being the difference
in price between two bonds of the same maturity, so the common components in (11) and (12)
cancel and the risk premium is determined solely by how the bond price conditionally covaries
with the stochastic discount factor and the yield on a one-period bond.
It is possible to decompose conditional and unconditional real term premia at all horizons
into components that depend on realisations and expectations, albeit with involved calculations.
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For example, the conditional term premium for n = 3 is
ψ
(3)
t =
1
3
{−Covt (mt+1,mt+2mt+3) + Covt (Etmt+1,Et+1mt+2Et+2mt+3)
+e−it [−Covt (mt+2,mt+3) + Covt (Et+1mt+2,Et+2mt+3)]
}
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 in Appendix A.1 present the general case. The resulting expres-
sions are independent of assumptions about information and the stochastic processes of external
disturbances, which gives the decomposition power to inform across many different environ-
ments. The only requirement is that the law of iterated expectations holds. We are particularly
interested in how the expectations components react to different informational assumptions.
4 A simple analytical model
This section uses the new decomposition to connect informational assumptions and term premia
in simple analytical models, in preparation for the more general investigation in Section 5.
4.1 Households, firms and technology
The economy consists of a representative household and a representative firm. The representative
household has inelastic labour supply lt = l¯ and solves the household’s optimisation problem in
Section 3.1. The representative firm produces output yt according to
yt = At l¯
1−α (15)
where the fixed capital stock is normalised to one, α ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter and the logarithm
of technology at ≡ lnAt follows the exogenous process
at = xt + ηt (16)
xt = ρxt−1 + εt (17)
with ρ ∈ (−1, 1), ηt ∼ N(0, σ2η), εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε) and Cov(ηt, εt) = 0. The logarithm of technology
hence has an AR(1) persistent component xt and an i.i.d. transitory component ηt. The house-
hold’s optimisation problem defines the general form (4) of the stochastic discount factor. We
assume that utility is logarithmic in consumption so the stochastic discount factor is
mt+1 = β
(
ct+1
ct
)−1
(18)
In equilibrium ct = At l¯
1−α for all t, since in the household’s budget constraint (2) labour is paid
its marginal product, firms make zero profits and bonds are in zero net supply. To a log-linear
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approximation the stochastic discount factor implied by the model becomes
mt+1 = β
(
At+1 l¯
1−α
At l¯1−α
)−1
≈ β (1 + at − at+1) (19)
It is instructive to begin with the shortest maturity n = 2 at which bonds have a non-zero real
term premium, for which the unconditional mean real term premium is given by equation (14).
The first term on the right hand side of (14) is the unconditional autocovariance of successive
realised stochastic discount factors. When the stochastic discount factor is approximated by
equation (19), the technology process (16) and (17) implies
− Cov(mt+1,mt+2) = β2
(
1− ρ
1 + ρ
σ2ε + σ
2
η
)
(20)
The autocovariance of realised stochastic discount factors Cov(mt+1,mt+2) in equation (20) is
independent of the household information set It, which means that informational assumptions
are fully reflected in the expectations component Cov(Etmt+1,Et+1mt+2) in the simple model.
4.2 Full information
The benchmark informational assumption is that households have full information about current
and past values of the persistent and transitory components of technology. The assumption is
that xt, ηt, at ⊂ I∗t , where I∗t is the information set of the representative household and the
superscript notation zt ≡ {zs}ts=0 indicates the entire history of a variable up to and including
period t. Taking expectations of the stochastic discount factor implied by the model (19) with
respect to I∗t gives its conditional expectation as
E(mt+1|I∗t ) = β(1 + at − ρxt) (21)
and the unconditional autocovariance of successive expected stochastic discount factors is
Cov
[
E(mt+1|I∗t ),E(mt+2|I∗t+1)
]
= β2
ρ(1− ρ)
1 + ρ
σ2ε (22)
With the unconditional autocovariance of successive realised stochastic discount factors (20) be-
ing independent of informational assumption, the unconditional mean of the real term premium
can be calculated analytically. Substituting the covariance terms (20) and (22) into (14) it is
Eψ
(2)
FI =
1
2
β2
[
(1− ρ)σ2ε + σ2η
]
(23)
Figure 1 depicts the mean real term premium Eψ
(2)
FI with full information in a quantitative
version of our model. In both panels we fix the discount factor β = 0.99 and the overall
volatility in technology at at Var(at) = 0.01
2, which leaves freedom to explore term premia in two
dimensions. The left panel plots the real term premium against the degree of persistence ρ in the
persistent component xt of the technology process, holding constant its relative contribution to
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Figure 1: Components of the mean real term premium (n = 2) with full information (FI).
β = 0.99 and Var(at) = 0.01
2. Left panel: Var(xt)/Var(at) = 0.9. Right panel: ρ = 0.8.
overall volatility in technology by setting σ2ε and σ
2
η such that Var(xt)/Var(at) = 0.9. In the right
panel we have the real term premium plotted against the relative contribution of the persistent
component, adjusting σ2ε and σ
2
η to fix the persistence of the persistent component at ρ = 0.8.
The term premium in each panel is decomposed into covariance terms −Cov(mt+1,mt+2) and
Cov
(
Et+1(mt+1|I∗t ),Et+2(mt+2|I∗t+1)
)
that respectively depend on realisations and expectations
of stochastic discount factors.
The real term premium for the model with full information is decreasing in the persistence
parameter ρ and the relative contribution of the persistent component of technology. Most of
the real term premium comes from the component that depends on realisations, which decreases
in ρ in the left panel of Figure 1 because at and at+1 enter equation (19) for the stochastic
discount factor with opposite signs. Higher autocovariance in technology therefore translates
into lower autocovariance in realised stochastic discount factors. The component of the real term
premium that depends on expectations first rises with ρ as the autocovariance of the persistence
component of technology increases. However, it eventually falls as a higher ρ reduces the extent
to which that autocovariance is loaded into expectations of the stochastic discount factor by
equation (21). The largest contribution from the expectations component comes at the value
of ρ that makes technology sufficiently persistent yet still tracked by expectations. At the
extremes expectations make no contribution to the real term premium, at ρ = 0 because there is
no persistence in the model and at ρ = 1 as a random walk in technology removes all persistence
from the stochastic discount factor. The expectations component increases with the relative
contribution of the persistent component to technology in the right panel of Figure 1, although
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its contribution remains small and dominated by the component that depends on realisations.
4.3 Partial information
The first relaxation of the full information benchmark supposes that the household knows cur-
rent and past values of technology but does not observe its decomposition into transitory and
persistent components. Formally, the representative household’s information set I ′t contains at
but there is no period s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t} such that xs ∈ I ′t or ηs ∈ I ′t.
The household forms expectations over future stochastic discount factors according to
E(mt+1|I ′t) = β
(
1 + at − ρE(xt|I ′t)
)
(24)
which requires them to infer the fraction of current technology that comes from its persistent
component. This is a standard signal extraction problem, requiring an estimate of the state xt
from a sequence of noisy signals at. The solution satisfies the Kalman filter recursion
ρE(xt|I ′t) = ρE(xt|I ′t−1) +Kt
[
at − E(xt|I ′t−1)
]
(25)
Σt+1 = ρ(ρ−Kt)Σt + σ2ε (26)
Kt =
ρΣt
Σt + σ2η
(27)
where Σt ≡ Var(xt|I ′t−1) and Kt is the Kalman gain. We further assume that x0 ∼ N(0,Σ), in
which case Σt andKt are constant for all t and the resulting autocovariance of expected stochastic
discount factors can be calculated numerically using Monte Carlo methods. The autocovariance
of realised stochastic discount factors is independent of the household’s information set, so
identical to that under full information. What these calculations imply for the real term premium
and its decomposition is shown in Figure 2.
If the majority of the volatility in technology comes from its persistent component then at is
a precise signal about xt and expectations formed using the Kalman filter are close to those with
full information. As can be seen from the left panel of Figure 2 drawn for Var(xt)/Var(at) = 0.9,
the expectations component of the real term premium under I ′t is practically identical to that
under the full information set I∗t at all levels of ρ. The right panel of Figure 2 shows a marginally
larger expectations component at intermediate levels of Var(xt)/Var(at) when ρ is fixed at 0.8,
but requiring the household to decompose technology into transitory and persistent components
still only has a very weak impact on the real term premium.
4.4 Noisy information
Adding noise to the household’s signal extraction problem does not generally result in larger
term premia in our model. To see this, we change the informational assumptions so that the
representation agent only observes noisy signals of current and past values of technology when
making decisions that determine the real term premium. Separating the information set relevant
10
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Figure 2: Components of the real term premium (n = 2) with full information (FI) and partial
information (PI). β = 0.99 and Var(at) = 0.01
2. Left panel: Var(xt)/Var(at) = 0.9. Right
panel: ρ = 0.8.
for the term premium from that determining labour supply and consumption is necessary to
prevent the household imputing the current level of technology from the wage rate or total
household income. It can be rationalised by dividing the household into a representative investor
and a representative consumer. The investor trades both maturities of bonds in financial markets
until the real term premium is arbitrage-free with respect to their information set, whereas the
consumer knows current technology when it supplies labour and allocates household income to
consumption and saving.3
The signal st has the form st = at + ξt with noise ξt ∼ N(0, σ2ξ ) that may correlate with the
transitory component of technology according to σηξ ≡ Cov(ηt, ξt). I ′′t is the information set of
the representative investor, defined such that st ⊂ I ′′t but with no period s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t} such
that as ∈ I ′′t , xs ∈ I ′′t or ηs ∈ I ′′t . The conditional expectation of mt+1 is
E
(
m|I ′′t
)
= β
(
1 + (1− ρ)E (xt|I ′′t )) (28)
and the representative investor has to infer the persistent component of technology from a
noisy signal, as before when it was unobservable. The solution satisfies the same Kalman filter
recursion defined by equations (25) and (26) in Section 4.3, only now the signal st = xt + ηt + ξt
3 The same issue arises in the permanent income model outlined by Sims (2003), where investors must have
only imperfect knowledge of household income. In our model the investor observing a noisy signal of technology
is isomorphic to them having a noisy signal of household income.
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Figure 3: Components of the real term premium (n = 2) with full information (FI) and noisy
information (NI). β = 0.99, Var(at) = 0.01
2, σ2ξ = Var(at)/2 and σ
2
ηξ = 0. Left panel:
Var(xt)/Var(at) = 0.9. Right panel: ρ = 0.8.
has noise ηt + ξt ∼ N(0, σ2η + σ2ξ + 2σηξ) so instead of (27) the Kalman gain is
Kst =
ρΣst
Σst + σ
2
η + σ
2
ξ + 2σηξ
(29)
with Σst ≡ Var(xt|I ′′t−1). What this implies for the real term premium is illustrated in Figure 3,
drawn for Var(ξt) = Var(at)/2 and σηξ = 0.
Assuming that technology is observed through a noisy signal reduces the expectations com-
ponent of the real term premium in both panels of Figure 3, most notably at intermediate
values of the persistence parameter ρ. Noise has the potential to inject additional volatility and
persistence into estimates of the persistent component of technology, but any effect on the au-
tocovariance of expected stochastic discount factors is offset by expectations no longer directly
reacting to realisations of technology. Expectations of the stochastic discount factor react to
at−ρxt with full information by equation (21) or at−ρE(xt|I ′t) with partial information by equa-
tion (24). But when there is noisy information they track (1−ρ)E (xt|I ′′t ) by equation (28). The
absence of a direct effect of at reduces the negative autocovariance of expectations and explains
the fall in the expectations component of the term premium. If the aim is to generate term
premia that match estimates from the data then adding noise in this way is counterproductive.
The finding that noise attenuates real term premia extends to the general case in which
the representative investor chooses the informational content of the noisy signals they observe,
subject to a limited information processing capacity. Luo and Young (2014) show that rational
inattention and signal extraction problems are isomorphic when the task is to extract an estimate
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of the persistent component of an exogenous process in a linear-quadratic Gaussian framework.
Their results apply to our model, so our findings extend to the general case under rational
inattention and we conclude that the expectations component of the real term premium is
dampened by noise, however that noise is introduced.
4.5 Beauty contests
The inability of either partial or noisy information to engender the autocovariance in expec-
tations required to support meaningful real term premia suggests a need for more radical in-
formational assumptions. In this section we do just that by dropping the assumption of the
representative investor and instead assuming that investors demand term premia on the basis
of heterogeneous forecasts of technology that are conditioned to be similar to the forecasts of
other investors. Our setup mirrors the classic Keynesian beauty contest, where to predict the
winner it is necessary to identify not only the prettiest contestant but also who other people
think is the prettiest. This coordinates investors in our model as they form expectations of the
expectations of others.
4.5.1 Information
The household is comprised of an investor and a consumer. There is a representative consumer
making labour supply and consumption decisions based on a common information set as be-
fore, but investors are heterogeneously informed. Investor i ∈ [0, 1] receives a signal si,t about
technology that has public and private noise components. Common noise nt and idiosyncratic
noise ni,t follow mean-zero AR(1) processes with common persistence parameter ρ and respective
innovations ξt ∼ N(0, σ2ξ ) and ζi,t ∼ N(0, σ2ζ ). The signal is
si,t = at + nt + ni,t = xt + nt + ni,t + ηt (30)
where the sum of all persistent components xni,t ≡ xt + nt + ni,t evolves as
xni,t = ρx
n
i,t−1 + ε
n
i,t (31)
with εni,t ≡ εt + ξt + ζi,t ∼ N(0, σ2ε + σ2ξ + σ2ζ ).4
The formal definition of the information set Ii,t of investor i is s
t
i ⊂ Ii,t but with no period
s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t} such that as ∈ Ii,t, xs ∈ Ii,t, ns ∈ Ii,t or ni,s ∈ Ii,t. We assume that the
transitory component of technology ηt is observable following the negligible effect of partial
information on the term structure in Section 4.3. This makes the persistent component xni,t
observable too and ηt, xn,ti ⊂ Ii,t.
4 It is possible to relax the assumption of a common ρ across persistent components and the assumption that
innovations to the persistent component are uncorrelated. We refrain from doing so as it delivers few additional
insights at a considerable burden to notation and presentation.
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4.5.2 Strategic complementarity
The expectations component of the term premium demanded by investor i depends as before
on the autocovariance of their expectations of stochastic discount factors. The equilibrium
stochastic discount factor for household i is analogous to that in equation (19), so the expectation
of its stochastic discount factor mˆi,t+1 formed is assumed to be constructed as
mˆi,t+1 = β(1 + (1− ρ)xˆi,t) (32)
in period t, which highlights the role played by forecasts xˆi,t of the permanent component
of technology. We target our strategic complementarity at this forecasting problem.5 Strategic
complementarities are introduced by assuming that investor i sets their forecast of the permanent
component of technology to minimise
(1− ω)E((xˆi,t − xt)2|Ii,t)− ωE
(∫ 1
0
xˆj,tdj
∣∣∣∣ Ii,t) xˆi,t (33)
where 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1 is a parameter measuring the degree of strategic complementarity.
The first term gives the investor an incentive to minimise the mean squared deviation of
their forecast from the true value of the persistent component of technology. This reflects the
investor acting on behalf of the household, and so wanting to produce a forecast that best
estimates the household’s stochastic discount factor. The second term captures a strategic
complementarity by rewarding the investor for a forecast that has the same sign as the expected
average forecast of all investors. If the average is expected to be positive then the investor
adjusts their forecast upwards, if negative the impetus is for the investor to adjust downwards.
This acts to coordinate forecasts and expectations. Constructs of this type have been used to
introduce strategic interactions in a variety of settings, although establishing microfoundations
for any given specification has proved challenging.6 The difficulties are also apparent here, so
we eschew precise microfoundations and proceed under the assumption that our specification
adequately captures incentives when the forecasts of others matters.7
5 In our linear model it could equally be assumed that there are complementarities in forecasting the stochastic
discount factor. We prefer to work with forecasts of technology since they have a clear empirical counterpart that
proves useful in disciplining estimation of the general model in Section 5.
6 In management science, Dessein and Santos (2006) and Dessein et al. (2016) posit a function similar to ours to
capture strategic complementarities in organising tasks. Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989) do likewise for strategic
complementarities in production, as does Vives (2014) in a finance environment. All these applications shy away
from the microfoundations of strategic complementarities, as does the microeconomic theory in Bergemann et al.
(2015).
7 The strategic complementarity in our model could be rationalised by fears that the household might suffer
a liquidity shock and so need to liquidate their bond holdings within the period, in which case they would be
interested in the expected price on liquidation.
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4.5.3 Equilibrium signal extraction
The first order condition of investor i implies that it sets its forecast according to
xˆi,t = E(xt|Ii,t) + ω
2(1− ω)E
(∫ 1
0
xˆj,tdj
∣∣∣∣ Ii,t) (34)
which adjusts the mean squared error minimising rational expectation of xt to account for the
strategic complementarity. The rational expectation of the persistent component of technology
is extracted from investor i’s noisy signal xni,t as
E(xt|Ii,t) =
(
σ2ε
σ2ε + σ
2
ξ + σ
2
ζ
)
xni,t (35)
That the expectation is linear in the signal suggests the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in
which the forecasts of all investors are a linear function of their respective signals
xˆj,t = θx
n
j,t ∀j (36)
where θ is a parameter to be determined in equilibrium, in which case investor i’s expectation
of investor j’s forecast solves the complementary signal extraction problem as
E(xˆj,t|Ii,t) = θE(xˆnj,t|Ii,t) = θ
(
σ2ε + σ
2
ξ
σ2ε + σ
2
ξ + σ
2
ζ
)
xni,t (37)
Symmetric linear equilibrium is confirmed with
θ =
(1− ω)σ2ε
(1− ω)(σ2ε + σ2ξ + σ2ζ )− ω2 (σ2ε + σ2ξ )
(38)
The equilibrium exists with 0 ≤ θ < ∞ provided 2(1 − ω)/ω > (σ2ε + σ2ξ )/(σ2ε + σ2ξ + σ2ζ ),
which is satisfied if there is a sufficiently private noise component σ2ζ in signals or only a limited
degree of strategic complementarity ω. The maximal strategic complementarity the model can
support is therefore bounded from above by a limit that depends on the variance of noise relative
to the variance of the persistent component of technology.8 We restrict ourselves throughout to
configurations of the model for which the condition holds.
The value of θ determines how much the investor’s forecasts xˆi,t and mˆi,t+1 react to the noisy
signals they observe. It is increasing and convex in ω in equilibrium, meaning that forecasts react
progressively more to signals when there are more strategic complementarities. When ω = 0 the
investor forecasts in isolation, being indifferent to the forecasts of others and having no reason
to consider whether the noise in their signal comes from a common or idiosyncratic component.
When ω > 0 the investor can no longer do this. They know that the forecasts of others react
to signals that have a common noise component, so to keep their forecast in line with others
they would ideally react to the common noise too. Since the common noise is unobservable and
8 Satisfying this bound is imposed in estimation.
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cannot be identified, the best the investor can do is react more to their own noisy signal.
4.5.4 Term premium
The real term premium demanded by investor i is again an average of covariances of succes-
sive realisations and expectations of the household’s stochastic discount factor. The strategic
complementarities in the beauty contest have no effect on realisations, which continue to have
the autocovariance calculated in Section 4.1. The autocovariance of expectations mirrors that
in forecasts of the stochastic discount factor, which inherit the properties of signals by their
equilibrium loading θ into the forecasts of the persistent component of technology. Combing
equations (14), (20), (32), (37) and (38) delivers the unconditional autocovariance of expected
stochastic discount factors
Cov (mˆi,t+1, mˆi,t+2) = β
2 ρ(1− ρ)
1 + ρ
θ2(σ2ε + σ
2
ξ + σ
2
ζ ) (39)
and the unconditional mean real term premium
Eψ
(2)
BC =
1
2
β2
{
(1− ρ)σ2ε + σ2η +
ρ(1− ρ)
1 + ρ
[
θ2(σ2ξ + σ
2
ζ )− (1− θ2)σ2ε
]}
(40)
The mean real term premium demanded by an investor depends on how much forecasts
react to signals in equilibrium, but strikingly is independent of the particular signal that the
investor receives. The reason is the standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM) intuition
that the term premium is a compensation for the risk that the investor gives up consumption
in a period when the marginal utility is high and receives a claim to consumption in a period
when the marginal utility is low. The risk depends on what is expected to happen to the
household’s stochastic discount factor, and is compensated for according to our decomposition
of the term premium into components that depend on the autocovariances of realisations and
expectations. The autocovariance of realisations is common to all households by our assumption
of a representative consumer that sets labour supply and decides on consumption and saving.
The autocovariance of expectations is a function of the volatility in expectations and how much
an investor expects their forecasts to persist into the future. These are identical for all investors,
volatility by construction and persistence because each investor projects their forecasts forward
using the persistence parameter that governs the persistent component in their signal. Whether
an investor thinks their household’s stochastic discount factor is currently high or low, they all
project forward in the same way, the autocovariance of expectations is common across investors,
and the no-arbitrage real term premium is independent of signals.
Figure 4 compares the mean real term premium with strategic interactions to the full in-
formation benchmark. The assumption is that ω = 0.5 and that there are equal quantities of
common and idiosyncratic noise that together account for 10% of the variance of signals. The
way that strategic complementarities persuade investors to react more to their noisy persistent
signals raises the autocovariance of expectations, boosting the expectations component of the
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Figure 4: Components of the mean term premium (n = 2) with full information (FI) and with
strategic complementarities from a beauty contest (BC). β = 0.99, Var(at) = 0.01
2, σ2ξ = σ
2
ζ =
0.05σ2ε and ω = 0.5. Left panel: Var(xt)/Var(at) = 0.9. Right panel: ρ = 0.8.
term premium. The willingness of investors to countenance fluctuating but coordinated forecasts
increases their demand for risk compensation and so drives up term premia.
Whilst investors agree on the real term premium, there is dispersion in their forecasts of
the household stochastic discount factor and hence the valuation they place on a bond of a
given maturity. Put another way, investors agree about the slope but not the intercept of
the yield curve. Focussing on the real term premium allows us to be agnostic about how these
differences are reconciled, but to avoid heterogeneity in valuations spilling over into heterogeneity
in household income we invoke a no-trade theorem. We make our model concordant with the
conditions in Milgrom and Stokey (1982) by recognising that the initial allocation before signals
are observed is Pareto efficient and by assuming that it is common knowledge under rational
expectations that trades must be mutually acceptable to both investors. There are no insurance
or transactional gains to trading bonds in our model, so the only reason to trade would be to take
advantage of another investor. The absence of gains to trade means that any such trade must
be disadvantageous to the other investor and so cannot take place under rational expectations.
There is no trade in equilibrium and investors hold zero bonds at all maturities.
5 A more general model
The results with the simple analytical model suggest that real term premia may be sizeable if
there is a beauty contest element to the formation of expectations. In this section we show
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that this still applies when some of the seemingly restrictive assumptions of the simple model
are relaxed. Our main innovation is to allow for endogeneity in labour supply, which creates
a business cycle in output. This is done by specifying a form for household preferences that
incorporates the disutility of labour and recognises that the household’s coefficient of relative risk
aversion is not necessarily equal to one. We further generalise by working with real term premia
at horizons of up to 20 quarters and by using the exact stochastic discount factor rather than
its log-linear approximation. The other features of the simple analytical model are retained, in
particular that a no-trade theorem prevents non-zero bond holdings. Sections 5.1-5.4 outline the
general model and present its quantitative implications through a series of numerical examples,
which sets the scene for taking the model to data in Section 5.5.
5.1 Model
The economy consists of heterogeneously-informed households and a representative firm. The
firm produces according to
yt = AtL
1−α
t (41)
and maximise profits by demanding labour Lt until the marginal product of labour is equal to
the wage rate. The household is divided into a representative consumer and a representative
investor, the latter receiving the same noisy signal of technology as they did in the simple
analytical model. The representative consumer has period utility
u(ct, lt) =
1
1− σ
(
ct − χ0 l
1+χ
t
1 + χ
)1−σ
(42)
following Greenwood et al. (1988). Commonly referred to as GHH preferences, this functional
form implies that labour supply is independent of wealth in equilibrium, and so provides a
tractable route to modelling realistic fluctuations without recourse to nominal rigidities or labour
market frictions (Gertler et al., 2012).9 The equilibrium conditions are standard, with the
household’s stochastic discount factor a function of current and future technology
mt+1 = β
γ1Aγ2t+1 − χ01+χ
(
(1−α)
χ0
At+1
)γ2
γ1A
γ2
t − χ01+χ
(
(1−α)
χ0
At
)γ2
−σ (43)
with γ1 and γ2 functions of parameters of the model. The full derivation of equilibrium conditions
and the stochastic discount factor is presented in Appendix A.2.
9 Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012) estimate a rich DSGE model with Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) preferences
that nest GHH preferences. Results with postwar US data provide strong support for the GHH specification,
using both Bayesian and maximum likelihood methods.
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5.2 Bond prices and valuations
The price of an n-period bond with full-information is
p
(n)
t (xt, ηt) = E
(
mt+1p
(n−1)
t+1
∣∣∣ I∗t ) (44)
The equilibrium price is a function of the current levels of the persistent and transitory compo-
nents of technology xt and ηt. Expectations are conditional on the full information set I
∗
t and
taken over the joint distribution of future technology and its components. The risk-neutral price
under full information is defined by
p˜
(n)
t (xt, ηt) = p
(1)
t E
(
p˜
(n−1)
t+1
∣∣∣ I∗t ) (45)
The valuation p
(n)
i,t of an n-period bond by investor i when they receive a noisy signal that has
common and idiosyncratic noise components is
p
(n)
i,t (x
n
i,t, ηt) = E
(
mˆt+1p
(n−1)
i,t+1
∣∣∣ Ii,t) (46)
It is a function of the sum of the persistent technology and noise components in their signal xni,t
and on the idiosyncratic component of technology ηt, both of which are observed by assumption.
The expectation is conditional on investor i’s information set Ii,t and is defined over the joint
distribution of the investor’s forecasts of future technology, its components, and the sum of the
persistent components in the signal. The corresponding risk-neutral bond valuation is
p˜
(n)
i,t (x
n
i,t, ηt) = p
(1)
i,t E
(
p˜
(n−1)
i,t+1
∣∣∣ Ii,t) . (47)
5.3 Computation
The equations for the pricing and valuing of bonds in Section 5.2 have a recursive structure that
enables us to compute term premia up to any desired horizon. Our algorithm has four steps.
1. The exogenous processes for technology and noise are discretised into Markov chains using
standard methods.
2. The joint conditional distributions of current and future endogenous variables are discre-
tised using a moment matching procedure.
3. Conditional real term premia are calculated up to any desired maturity by recursively
integrating over the joint conditional distributions of exogenous and endogenous variables
at successively increasing horizons.
4. The unconditional real term premium is approximated by Monte Carlo simulation.
Steps 1 to 4 deliver an accurate numerical characterisation of the real term premium, providing
that enough nodes are used when discretising and that the Monte Carlo simulation has converged.
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We find that 15 nodes and simulating for 106 periods is sufficient. Full details of the algorithm
are presented in Appendix A.3.
5.4 Term premia
The real term premia in the general model are illustrated in Figure 5. Each panel plots the
average real term premium in bond prices against maturity, at different intensities of strategic
interaction ω ∈ {0, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6} and for a given calibration of risk aversion σ. The coefficient of
relative risk aversion varies from σ = 1 in panel a) through to σ = 4 in panel d). In red are
the corresponding average real term premia under the full information benchmark. The model
is parameterised as in Section 4.5 where possible, so the discount factor β is 0.99, the overall
volatility in technology Var(at) is 0.01
2, the degree of persistence ρ in the persistent component
xt of the technology process is 0.8, the relative contribution of technology to overall volatility
is held constant by setting σ2ε and σ
2
η such that Var(xt)/Var(at) = 0.9, and there are equal
quantities of common and idiosyncratic noise that contribute 10% to the variance of signals.
The parameters not shared with the simple analytical model are the labour share of income
1−α, the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply χ and the utility weight on labour χ0. These
are set at standard values 0.67, 0.5 and 1.67 so that steady-state hours worked are one third of
the time endowment.
The general model has an increasing and concave term structure. A higher degree of strategic
complementarity ω is associated with a steeper term structure, as expected from the discussion
in Section 4.5.4. Real term premia are below their full information equivalents when ω is low
because the reaction of investors to their signal is muted and there is only limited volatility in
their forecasts. As ω rises so does the reaction coefficient θ and enough noise enters investors’
forecasts that real term premia rise above those in the full information case. The coefficient of
relative risk aversion σ raises term premia and amplifies the effects of ω.
5.5 Quantitative analysis
The model is now confronted with US data. Our interest is in how much the model can explain
average term premia at different maturities. To find out, we estimate the model and derive what
its parameter estimates entail for the average real term premium at different horizons. We only
use data at the shortest maturity when estimating the model, preferring instead to identify ω
in the model with strategic complementarities by requiring the cross-sectional and time-series
distributions of forecasts implied by the model to be consistent with those of productivity growth
forecasts in the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
5.5.1 Data
The sample period for estimation is 1999q1-2017q2.
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Figure 5: Real term premia with different strategic complementarities and risk aversion
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Figure 6: Forecasts of productivity growth from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Solid
line: Median. Dashed lines: lower and upper quartiles.
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The Survey of Professional Forecasters asks participants at the beginning of each year to
forecast the average annual growth in labour productivity over the next ten years. The survey
responses are shown in Figure 6, where the solid line is the median of the cross-sectional distri-
bution each period and the dashed lines are the lower and upper quartiles. Not all forecasters
respond every time they are asked. Over the 26 years for which data is available, the number of
respondents ranges from 21 to 46 with an average of 30.5. Moments of this series are used when
estimating the parameters governing forecasts in the model with strategic complementarities.
We calculate moments over the whole period 1992-2017 for which data is available.10
Consumption is measured as the quarterly sum of real personal consumption expenditure
on non-durables and services recorded by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. It is transformed
into per capita terms using data on the civilian non-institutional population from the Bureau
of Labour Statistics. Labour supply is taken as the quarterly average weekly hours worked in
the non-farm business sector reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Consumption and
labour supply data are used to estimate the exogenous processes for technology that drive the
household’s stochastic discount factor.
Data on the term premium provides a benchmark against which models can be judged.
Estimates of the term premium on nominal zero-coupon Treasuries are available from Adrian
et al. (2013) for maturities between one and ten years.11 The premia estimated on yields are
converted into premia on bond prices using p
(n)
t = exp(−ni(n)t ). The term premium is calculated
as the annualised difference between the prices of a bond and its risk-neutral counterpart. High
frequency data is averaged where necessary.
5.5.2 Calibrated parameters
Table 1 lists a subset of parameters that are calibrated before estimating the model. The
discount factor is set to match the steady-state annualised yield on a four-quarter bond in the
model to the average yield on one-year zero-coupon nominal Treasuries in the data.12 The mean
is 2.05% in the data, which includes an extended period when overnight rates were at the effective
lower bound. The labour share of income 1 − α is fixed at 61.6%, the mean share of labour
compensation in GDP in the data. The parameter χ is equal to the inverse Frisch elasticity of
labour supply. It can be shown that Var(ln lt)/Var(ln ct) = 1/(1 + χ)
2 in equilibrium, so χ is
chosen such that the relative standard deviation of hours and consumption in the model matches
that in detrended data. The value that results lies in the range of common calibrations. The
weight on labour disutility χ0 is calibrated so that 1/3 of the time endowment is spent working
10 Calculating moments from 1997 to match the sample period for estimation does not lead to significant changes.
11 Adrian et al. (2013) use a regression-based approach to estimate an affine term structure model with five
pricing factors. Their frequently-updated estimates are available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/
data_indicators/term_premia.html.
12 Matching the steady-state yield on a real bond in the model to the average yield on a nominal bond in the
data implicitly assumes that the inflation compensation component in yields is negligible at this maturity. This
is reasonable for four-quarter bonds, especially given the low and stable inflation over the sample period.
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Parameter Value Description Target
(Data)
β 0.995 Discount factor i(4) = 0.0205
(Yield curve estimates, Adrian et al. (2013),
4/1/99 - 30/6/17)
α 0.384 1 - Labour share 1− α = 0.6160
(Share of labour compensation in GDP, Penn World Table,
1999-2014)
χ 0.708 Inverse Frisch elasticity Var(ln lt)/Var(ln ct) = 0.3428
(Consumption of nondurables and services, BEA;
Population and hours, BLS, 1999Q1-2017Q2)
χ0 2.04 Labour utility weight l = 1/3
Table 1: Calibrated parameters
in steady state.13
5.5.3 Estimation procedure
The model parameters to be estimated relate to the exogenous processes for technology and
noise, the degree of strategic complementarities and the coefficient of relative risk aversion. We
estimate them using a method-of-moments procedure that fits the model to moments of the
data from consumption and the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The process for technology
in the model is independent of the degree of strategic complementarities or risk aversion, so its
parameters can be estimated independently. The remaining parameters can then be estimated
conditional on the process fitted to technology.
There are three parameters to estimate in the exogenous process for technology, the vari-
ance of the transitory component and the innovation variance and persistence of the persistent
component. We collect these in the vector Φ1 = (ρ ση σε). The properties of the technology
process are inherited by consumption through an equilibrium relationship that only depends on
calibrated parameter values, hence we can estimate the parameters of interest from the moments
of the detrended consumption data. Our method-of-moments estimator targets the variance and
autocovariance of consumption and the variance of the consumption growth rate by minimising
the sum of squared deviations of the model from these moments. We are able to match the
moments almost perfectly with a computationally efficient procedure that exploits closed form
expressions to calculate the moments of detrended consumption in the model.14
Having estimated Φ1 we proceed to estimate Φ2 = (σξ σζ ω σ), the innovation variances of
common and idiosyncratic noise, the degree of strategic complementarity, and the coefficient of
13 The share of labour compensation in GDP is taken from the Penn World Table 9.0 and has declined from
around 64% at the beginning of the sample to values close to 60% from 2009 onwards. We detrend when necessary
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with λ = 1600 for quarterly data.
14 The equilibrium relationship is ln ct = ln css + (χ+ 1)/(χ+ α)at from Appendix A.2.
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relative risk aversion. Three moments from the Survey of Professional Forecasters are targeted.
The first two are the variance and autocovariance of the median forecast γˆ50t of technology
growth over the next ten years, which proves highly informative for the estimates of ω, σξ
and σζ because these parameters affect the amount of noise incorporated in forecasts. The third
moment to target is the mean interquartile range of forecasts γˆ75t − γˆ25t , which helps in allocating
the volatility in noise into its idiosyncratic and common components.
The moments from the Survey of Professional Forecasters are not informative about the
coefficient of relative risk aversion. We therefore target one additional moment, the mean term
premium on a one-year nominal Treasury.15 This does not mean that we are targeting the
whole term structure in estimation. Instead, we are allowing the estimation of the coefficient of
relative risk aversion to target the smallest term premium in the data. This aims at matching
the term premium at a single point on the yield curve, so it is a legitimate test of the model to
ask whether it can explain term premia at other points on the yield curve with longer horizons.
The procedure yields an estimate of σ that is within the range typically considered.
The method-of-moments estimator of Φ2 minimises a weighted sum of squared deviations of
the model from the four targeted moments. The weighting matrix is constructed in the standard
way as the inverse of a bootstrap estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the moments
of the Survey of Professional Forecasters. It implies that less weight is placed on matching the
mean interquartile range, since that moment is measured with less precision than the others.16
5.5.4 Estimation results
The parameter estimates are presented in Table 2. The persistent component of the technology
process is highly persistent, with an innovation standard deviation about twice that of the i.i.d.
transitory component. The idiosyncratic and common noise components share their persistence
with the persistent component of technology, so their volatilities are directly comparable from
the standard deviations of their innovations; idiosyncratic noise has about one third the volatility
of the persistent component of technology. The volatility of the common noise component is
an order of magnitude smaller. We find a role for strategic complementarities in explaining the
survey data, by estimating that forecasters place a positive weight on their forecasts having the
same sign as the expected average forecast of others.17 The model is able to match the mean
term premium on a one-year nominal Treasury without excessive levels of risk aversion.
15 Targetting the average term premium on a nominal Treasury again abstracts from inflation compensation in
yields, this time by implicitly assuming that there is no inflation risk premium in the data at this maturity.
16 The estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the sample moments is based on 100,000 bootstrapped
draws of the data. The weight on the fourth moment is not relevant because the coefficient of relative risk
aversion does not affect the moments of the forecast of technology generated by the model. It only affects the
term premium on a one-year nominal Treasury, so the fourth moment can be matched perfectly irrespective of its
weight in the estimation.
17 The estimate of ω is at the upper bound that the model can support in equilibrium. As explained in Section
4.5.4, this is the maximal strategic complementarity that permits existence of equilibrium with θ > 0 for the
estimated technology and noise processes.
24
Parameter Estimate Description
ρ 0.904 Shock persistence
σε 2.01× 10−3 SD of innovation to persistent component of technology
ση 9.56× 10−4 SD of i.i.d. transitory component of technology
σξ 1.51× 10−5 SD of innovation to common component of noise
σζ 3.44× 10−4 SD of innovation to idiosyncratic component of noise
ω 0.667 Strategic complementarity
σ 4.58 Coefficient of relative risk aversion
Table 2: Parameter estimates
Moment US data Estimated Model with full Model with
1999q1-2017q2 model information with ω = 0
Targeted
Var
(
γˆ50t
)
1.52× 10−5 1.51× 10−5 1.38× 10−8 1.30× 10−8
Cov
(
γˆ50t , γˆ
50
t−4
)
1.25× 10−5 1.00× 10−5 8.76× 10−9 8.27× 10−9
E
(
γˆ75t − γˆ25t
)
5.32× 10−3 9.01× 10−4 0 2.59× 10−5
Eψ
(4)
t 8.22 bps 8.22 bps 2.92 bps 2.61 bps
Not targeted
Eψ
(8)
t 21.17 bps 14.90 bps 4.61 bps 3.91 bps
Eψ
(12)
t 34.45 bps 19.19 bps 5.76 bps 4.73 bps
Eψ
(16)
t 46.71 bps 21.97 bps 6.60 bps 5.28 bps
Eψ
(20)
t 57.20 bps 23.78 bps 7.20 bps 5.65 bps
Table 3: Moments of the data and the models
The estimated model matches the moments relating to consumption dynamics almost per-
fectly. The variance of consumption, the autocovariance of consumption and the variance of the
consumption growth rate are 5.64, 4.90 and 1.48 respectively, compared to the target values of
5.59, 4.96 and 1.51 from the data. It follows that the volatility in hours worked must match the
data almost perfectly too, since the inverse Frisch elasticity is calibrated such that the relative
volatility of hours and consumption is equal to that in the data.
Table 3 shows how the estimated model performs relative to other moments in the data. The
second and third columns reveal that the model does well in capturing the moments targeted
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, with the variance and autocovariance of the median
forecasts lining up in the data and the model. The model generates some dispersion in forecasts
but not as much as in the data, although that in part is due to the low weight that is placed on
matching the relatively imprecise estimate of the interquartile range that comes from the data.
The model is able to match the mean term premium on a one-year nominal Treasury perfectly
by suitable choice of the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
The final four rows in Table 3 assess the fit of the model to moments that are not targeted
in estimation. The model delivers an annualised real term premium of 14.9, 19.2, 22.0 and 23.8
bps at 2, 3, 4 and 5 year horizons, between 40% and 70% of the corresponding annualised term
premia in the data. To understand the success in this dimension we add two more models in
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the fourth and fifth columns of Table 3. The model with full information takes the estimates
from Table 2 and assumes that households observe the current level of technology and its de-
composition into persistent and transitory components. Making technology observable renders
estimates of the noise processes and the degree of strategic complementarities irrelevant. The
model with ω = 0 also adopts the parameter estimates in Table 2, but abstracts from strategic
complementarities by removing the incentive for forecasters to coordinate their forecasts. The
informational assumptions are otherwise as in the estimated model.
The term premia in the full information and ω = 0 models fall badly short of those in the
data and the estimated model. The level of the term premia can be brought closer to the data
by estimating the alternative models rather than taking the estimates from Table 2, but doing
so comes at the cost of significantly higher estimates for the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
The reason why the full information and ω = 0 models fail is their inability to generate sizeable
variance and autocovariance in forecasts of technology. Forecasts are anchored to technology
in the full information model and to rational expectations in the ω = 0 model, neither of
which leaves much scope for a large expectations component in term premia. The variances
and autocovariances in these models are several orders of magnitude less than in the Survey of
Professional Forecasters. It is only in the estimated model with strategic complementarities that
movements in forecasts are sufficient to rationalise the term premia observed at longer horizons.
Forecasts are not very disperse in the ω = 0 model and by definition not disperse at all in
the full information model. The lack of heterogeneity in forecasts contributes to the low real
term premia in these models, but it cannot explain why their term structures are so flat. The
dispersion of forecasts is low in the estimated model, yet it still supports a term structure that
is clearly upward-sloping.
6 Conclusion
Our findings stress the importance of informational assumptions in models of the term struc-
ture of interest rates, as starkly visible in Figure 7 when comparing the term structure in our
models to estimates from US data. The estimated model exactly matches the term premium
at the short end since it is targeted in estimation, but in doing so the data prefers strategic
complementarities over an unrealistically high coefficient of relative risk aversion. With these
strategic complementarities in place, the estimated model can explain a significant proportion
of term premia at all maturities, even though they have not been targeted. The full information
model is singularly unable to do this with realistic levels of risk aversion, failing to deliver either
sizeable term premia or a term structure that is upward sloping.
The success of the estimated model is driven by a beauty contest in forecasting, which
rewards investors for being not only accurate but also close to the average forecast of others.
Even though we discipline the strength of the beauty contest by requiring the distribution of
forecasts in the model to be consistent with that in the Survey of Professional Forecasters, we are
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Figure 7: Term premia in the data and in the models
still able to justify 40% of the term premium in the data at the 5-year horizon. The remaining
60% may be due to inflation risk premia or stronger strategic complementarities than can be
supported in equilibrium in our models.
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Appendix A
A.1 Generalisation of the decomposition
Begin by expanding the price of an n-period bond (5)
p
(n)
t = Et
n∏
j=1
mt+j
= (Etmt+1)(Etmt+2) . . . (Etmt+n) + Covt(mt+1,mt+2mt+3 . . .mt+n)
+ (Etmt+1)Covt(mt+2,mt+3mt+4 . . .mt+n)
+ (Etmt+1)(Etmt+2)Covt(mt+3,mt+4mt+5 . . .mt+n)
+ . . .
+ (Etmt+1)(Etmt+2) . . . (Etmt+n−2)Covt(mt+n−1,mt+n)
=
n∏
j=1
Etmt+j + Covt
mt+1, n∏
j=2
mt+j
+ n−2∑
k=1
 k∏
j=1
Etmt+j
Covt
mt+k+1, n−2∏
j=k
mt+j+2

Since p
(1)
t = Etmt+1 from (5) it follows from (6) that Etmt+1 = exp(−it) and by the law of
iterated expectations Etmt+j = Etexp(−it+j−1) for j > 0. Substituting into the above
p
(n)
t =
n−1∏
j=0
Ete
−it+j + Covt
mt+1, n∏
j=2
mt+j

+
n−2∑
k=1
k−1∏
j=0
Ete
−it+j
Covt
mt+k+1, n−2∏
j=k
mt+j+2

The risk-neutral price (7) can analogously be expanded as
p˜
(n)
t = Et
n∏
j=1
e−it+j−1
=
n∏
j=1
Ete
−it+j−1 + Covt
e−it , n∏
j=2
e−it+j−1

+
n−2∑
k=1
 k∏
j=1
Ete
−it+j−1
Covt
e−it+k , n−2∏
j=k
e−it+j+1

Substituting for Etmt+1 = exp(−it)
p˜
(n)
t =
n−1∏
j=0
Ete
−it+j + Covt
Etmt+1, n∏
j=2
Et+j−1mt+j

+
n−2∑
k=1
k−1∏
j=0
Ete
−it+j
Covt
Et+kmt+k+1, n−2∏
j=k
Et+j+1mt+j+2

31
The general decomposition of the per-period real term premium in bond prices (9) into com-
ponents depending on realisations and expectations follows as Proposition 1 for the real term
premium and Corollary 1 for the mean real term premium.
Proposition 1. The real term premium ψ
(n)
t for n ∈ {2, 3, . . .} is given by
ψ
(n)
t =
1
n
n−2∑
k=0
ιt(k)
−Covt
mt+k+1, n−2∏
j=k
mt+j+2
+ Covt
Et+kmt+k+1, n−2∏
j=k
Et+j+1mt+j+2

where
ιt(k) ≡
1 for k = 0∏k−1
j=0 Ete
−it+j otherwise
Corollary 1. The real term premium Eψ(n) for n ∈ {2, 3, . . .} is given by
Eψ(n) =
1
n
n−2∑
k=0
E [ιt(k)]
−Cov
mt+k+1, n−2∏
j=k
mt+j+2
+ Cov
Etmt+k+1,Et n−2∏
j=k
mt+j+2
+
Cov
Et+kmt+k+1, n−2∏
j=k
Et+j+1mt+j+2
− Cov
Etmt+k+1,Et n−2∏
j=k
Et+j+1mt+j+2
+
Cov
ιt(k),−Covt
mt+k+1, n−2∏
j=k
mt+j+2
+ Covt
Et+kmt+k+1, n−2∏
j=k
Et+j+1mt+j+2

A.2 Equilibrium in the general model
The Lagrangian of the representative consumer’s utility maximisation problem is
L =
∞∑
t=0
βtEt
((
u(ct, lt) + λt
(
wtlt + dt +
N∑
n=1
p
(n−1)
t b
(n)
t−1 − ct −
N∑
n=1
p
(n)
t b
(n)
t
))∣∣∣∣∣ I∗t
)
where I∗t is their information set. The first order conditions are
0 = uc(ct, lt)− λt
0 = −λtp(n)t + βEt
(
λt+1p
(n−1)
t+1
∣∣∣ I∗t )
0 = −ul(ct, lt) + λtwt
Profit maximisation by the firm sets wt = (1− α)AtL−αt , bonds are in zero net supply, and all
markets clear. Combining the first and third first order conditions gives wt = l
χ
t and consumption
drops out of the intratemporal condition for labour supply, as expected with GHH preferences.
Labour market clearing defines
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lt =
(
(1− α)At
χ0
) 1
χ+α
Consumption is
ct =
(
1− α
χ0
) 1−α
χ+α
A
χ+1
χ+α
t
and investor i’s valuation of an n-period bond satisfies
p
(n)
i,t = Et
(
mt+1p
(n−1)
i,t+1
∣∣∣ Ii,t)
for n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, p(0)t = 1, and
mt+1 = β
γ1Aγ2t+1 − χ01+χ
(
(1−α)
χ0
At+1
)γ2
γ1A
γ2
t − χ01+χ
(
(1−α)
χ0
At
)γ2
−σ
with γ1 ≡ ((1− α)/χ0)(1−α)/(χ+α) and γ2 ≡ (χ+ 1)/(χ+ α).
A.3 Computational algorithm
Before describing the algorithm, it is necessary to identify the joint conditional distributions of
current and future endogenous variables that investors use to price the term premium. Under
full information these are the usual conditional distributions under rational expectations that
can be characterised by standard signal extraction results. Things are more involved when infor-
mation is heterogeneous and there are strategic complementarities, because investors price the
term premium according to forecasts rather than rational expectations. The key determinant of
forecasts is the conditional distribution of investor i’s forecast of the current persistent compo-
nent of technology, conditional on the signal they observe. The first moment of this conditional
forecast is pinned down by the linear reaction of the forecast to the signal, but our procedure for
setting forecasts is silent on its conditional second moment. We therefore fix the second moment
at what it would be under rational expectations.
xt|xni,t ∼ N
[
θxni,t,
σ2ε
1− ρ2
(
1− σ
2
ε
σ2ε + σ
2
ξ + σ
2
ζ
)]
A detailed description of steps 1 to 4 follows.
1. The univariate exogenous processes for zt where z ∈ {x, η, xni , ε, ξ + ζi} are approximated
by finite-state Markov chains with N˜ nodes using the Tauchen (1986) procedure. The
vector of nodes x˜z = (x˜z,1, x˜z,2, . . . , x˜z,N˜ ) is chosen so that the extremes x˜z,N˜ = −x˜z,1 cover
a multiple of the standard deviation of the unconditional distribution of zt. The remaining
nodes partition [x˜z,1, x˜z,N˜ ] into equispaced intervals. The transition probabilities between
nodes follow from the normal distribution of zt.
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2. To discretise the key conditional distribution xt|xni,t we adapt and adopt methods of Gauss-
Hermite quadrature. Let Πx|xn be an N˜ × N˜ matrix to be populated by conditional
probabilities
[
Πx|xn
]
i,j
= Pr(x˜x,j |x˜xni ,i) ≡ pii,j over the nodes x˜x and x˜xni calculated in
Step 1. The probabilities pii ≡ (pii,1, pii,2, . . . , pii,N˜ ) in row i of the matrix condition on
x˜xni ,i and are chosen to minimise the Euclidean distance between the first N˜ − 1 central
moments implied by the discretisation and their theoretical counterparts.
min
pii
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

N˜∑
j=1
pii,j
(
x˜x,j − θx˜xni ,i
)k
N˜−1
k=0
−
{
Et
(
(xt − θx˜xni ,i)k|xni,t
)}N˜−1
k=0
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
s.t. pii,j ∈ [0, 1] ∀j
where the index k runs from 0 to N˜ − 1 to include the monopole zeroth moment so
that probabilities sum to one. The advantage of our approach is that probabilities are
calculated row-by-row, which means solving N˜ systems of N˜ equations to complete the
approximation rather than the N˜ systems of 2N˜ that have to be solved with standard
Gaussian quadrature methods. The gain in computational efficiency allows to improve
accuracy by selecting higher values of N˜ .
3. It is straightforward to calculate conditional real term premia once the relevant condi-
tional distributions have been discretised in Step 2. The use of the nodes and transition
probabilities calculated in Step 1 as support for the discretisation in Step 2 avoids any
need to interpolate between nodes.
4. The unconditional real term premium is approximated by the difference in sample averages
between Monte Carlo valuations of a bond and its risk-neutral counterpart. The sample
average of the valuation of the bond is
p
(n)
i (x˜xni ,i, x˜η,j) =
N˜∑
k=1
N˜∑
l=1
N˜∑
m=1
N˜∑
n=1
pii,kγ
ε
i,lγ
η
i,mγ
ξ+ζi
i,n
β
γ1(e
ρx˜x,k+x˜ε,l+x˜η,m)γ2 − χ01+χ
[
(1−α)
χ0
eρx˜x,k+x˜ε,l+x˜η,m
]γ2
γ1(ex˜x,k+x˜η,j )γ2 − χ01+χ
[
(1−α)
χ0
ex˜x,k+x˜η,j
]γ2

−σ
×
p(n−1)(ρx˜xni ,i + x˜ε,l + x˜ξ+ζi,n, x˜η,m)
where γzi,j ≡ [Γz]i,j and we use linear interpolation to evaluate p(n−1)i (ρx˜xni ,i + x˜ε,l +
x˜ξ+ζi,n, x˜η,m) because its arguments will not typically lie on one of the nodes constructed in
Step 1. The sample average valuation of the bond with full information can be calculated
similarly, although there is no need for moment-matching in Step 2 or linear interpolation
in Step 4 since it is priced by rational expectations rather than forecasts. The sample
average of the risk-neutral counterparts follow analogously.
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Figure 8: Approximation error in distribution of xt|xni,t
To achieve precision in computations we set N˜ = 15, which is significantly larger than the
values typically used in the literature. The extremes of the vector of nodes in Step 1 are at
±7 standard deviations for all the exogenous processes, with the exception of xni for which
a lower span of ±2 standard deviations is imposed to guarantee that the conditional forecast
θxni,t remains in [x˜x,1, x˜x,N˜ ] even for large θ. Figure 8 shows the Euclidean distance between
discretised and theoretical moments in Step 2 for different values of ω. At all levels of strategic
complementarity the mean squared distance on the vertical axis lies between 10−5 and 10−8,
implying a high degree of accuracy when approximating the xt|xni,t distribution.
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